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DEATH OR TRANSFORMATION? EDUCATIONAL
AUTONOMY IN THE ROBERTS COURT
Elizabeth Dale*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz2 a number
of commentators argued that the Court had begun to embrace a new constitutional
doctrine that required deference to the decisions of some institutions.3 Most notably they
asserted that the Court would defer within the field of education.4  But even as they
suggested that the Court was more willing to explore the doctrine, those two opinions left
several large questions unanswered: 5 Did the Court's embrace of institutional autonomy
extend beyond higher education, into the K-12 realm? If so, what were its bounds? Was
the doctrine only relevant to efforts to achieve a diverse student body or could it be
extended further, to have an impact on claims of right under the First, or other,
Amendments?
6
* J.D./Ph.D. Affiliate Professor, Levin College of Law, Associate Professor of Constitutional and Legal
History, Department of History, University of Florida.
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3. The doctrine of institutional autonomy was articulated most famously in Frederick Schauer, Principles,
Institutions and the First Amendment, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1998). See also Symposium, Constitutional
"Niches ": The Role of Institutional Context in Constitutional Law, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1463 (2007).
4. See e.g. Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard
Questions, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1497 (2007); Neal Kumar Katyal, The Promise and Precondition of Educational
Autonomy, 31 Hastings Const. L. Q. 557 (2003); but see Robert A. Caplan, The "Fifth" Freedom: Freedom
from Impermissible Expansion of Academic Freedom to University Admissions, 36 Sw. L. Rev. 1 (2007)
(arguing against educational autonomy in the area of admissions); Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic
Freedom or Autonomy Grounded on the First Amendment: A Jurisprudential Mirage, 30 Hamlin L. Rev. 1
(2007) (expressing significant doubts about the doctrine in the First Amendment realm); Scott A. Moss,
Against "Academic Deference": How Recent Developments in Employment Discrimination Law Undercut an
Already Dubious Doctrine, 27 Berkeley J. Empl. & Lab. L. 1 (2006) (arguing that the doctrine of deference
cannot protect employment decisions in the university).
5. Other significant questions that I do not address remained as well. To note just a few: Who should
exercise educational autonomy in a university setting, the faculty or the administration? E.g. Katyal, supra n.
4, at 566-67 (arguing that it should be faculty). What were the core areas of the educational enterprise entitled
to autonomy? E.g. Horwitz, supra n. 4, at 1535-37 (exploring different ways by which these core principles
might be identified).
6. For example, one might read Justice Kennedy's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, with its emphasis on
the fact that Ceballos was an assistant prosecutor, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006), as evidence that the Court was
willing to defer to certain government institutions in the First Amendment area. And there are those who argue
that deference to particular government agencies is appropriate in that realm. E.g. David Fagunder, State
Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1637 (2003) (arguing for a theory of institutional
rights as a way to analyze the speech of government employees and agency speakers).
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Two cases from the Roberts Court's October 2006 Term, Parents Involved v.
Seattle School District7 and Morse v. Frederick,8 answered those questions. But the
answers they provided are obscure. At first glance, the cases seem to indicate that a clear
majority of the Court rejects the idea that educational autonomy should be extended to
elementary and secondary schools. But a closer look indicates a more complicated
response: A narrow majority of the Court believes that the principle of educational
autonomy articulated in Grutter may sometimes extend to cases involving K-12
schools. 9 At the same time, a slightly different, but still narrow, majority believes that
principles of educational autonomy cannot limit the First Amendment rights of K-12
students. 
10
II. INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY IN EDUCATION
A. Gratz and Grutter
At the end of its October 2002 Term the Supreme Court decided two cases
involving affirmative action plans at the University of Michigan. In Gratz v. Bollinger
1 1
the Court struck down the assessment process that the University of Michigan used in
undergraduate admissions on the ground that it applied a race-based quota in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 In contrast, in Grutter v.
Bollinger13 a majority of the Court upheld the admissions program at the University of
Michigan Law School, notwithstanding the fact that it also took membership in an
underrepresented racial or ethnic minority into account. 
14
The different outcomes largely rested on the Court's assessment of the
methodology of the two plans: In Gratz a majority of the Court found that admissions
decisions about applicants were not based on individualized assessments. 5 Instead, the
University assigned points to applicants according to an elaborate assessment scheme
16
and the total of those points (which included an automatic twenty point award to
applicants who were members of "underrepresented racial or ethnic minority
group[s]") 17 determined whether a candidate would be admitted or not.' 8 In Grutter, on
the other hand, the Court found that the law school's admission process 19 assessed
candidates based on a number of "hard" and "soft" variables (including the fact that a
candidate was a member of an "underrepresented" minority group),20 but also required
7. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
8. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
9. See infra pt. IV.
10. See infra pt. IV.
11. 539 U.S. 244.
12. Id. at 250-51.
13. 539 U.S. 306.
14. Id. at 343.
15. 539 U.S. at 269.
16. Id. at 254-56 (describing the evaluation process in its various iterations).
17. Id. at 255.
18. Id. at255-56.
19. 539 U.S. at 315-16 (describing process).
20. Id. (brackets omitted).
[Vol. 43:725
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an individualized assessment of each candidate. 2 1 That particularized review of the files
distinguished Grutter from Gratz and meant the law school's program survived an Equal
Protection challenge.
22
As that summary suggests, both cases turned on the question of whether a race-
conscious admissions process violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Court
nominally applied the traditional strict scrutiny analysis in each case.2 3 But the Court's
treatment of strict scrutiny in the two cases differed. Writing for the majority in Grutter
Justice O'Connor consciously adopted Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,24 specifically his assertion that Court precedent 25
indicated that there were times when the Court should defer to the judgment of university
administrators. 26 In Grutter, as in Bakke, this meant that the majority modulated the
demands of strict scrutiny in order to allow the university "'to make its own judgments
as to education .. ,,27
Justice Powell's ultimate conclusion, which was joined by four other justices,2 8
that the admissions policy at issue in Bakke was unconstitutional made it clear that
deference did not mean that a university received a free pass.2 9 Instead it meant that in
an Equal Protection case a university could survive a strict scrutiny challenge to a policy
that took race into account by demonstrating that its narrowly tailored plan was a
reasonable approach to an educational policy that it deemed significant. Deference
occurred with respect to the last clause of that statement3 '-in Grutter a majority of the
Court accepted without question the law school's judgment that a diverse student body
was a vital element of an elite legal education.
32
In contrast, in Gratz the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist did
not explicitly employ the principle of institutional autonomy. But while he did not cast
his analysis in terms of deference, the Chief Justice's opinion could be squared with the
logic of Grutter. In Gratz the majority did not question the University of Michigan's
assertion that a diverse student body was vital to its educational mission, 33 rather it held
21. Id. at 315.
22. Id. at 334-35.
23. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law: Principles and Policies 645 (2d ed., Aspen 2002) (outlining the standard for strict scrutiny in Equal
Protection analysis); but see generally Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26
Cardozo L. Rev. 1689 (2005) (arguing that Grutter reflected an unstated rejection of strict scrutiny analysis).
24. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323-24.
25. Regents of the U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1977) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
26. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
27. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312).
28. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271 (This part of Justice Powell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens.).
29. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-34 (to the same effect).
30. Id. at 334.
3 1. For purposes of this article, I use the definition of deference set out in Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of
Deference, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2008).
32. 539 U.S. at 333.
33. 539 U.S. at 268 (rejecting petitioners' argument that "'diversity as a basis for employing racial
preferences is simply too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest capable of
supporting narrowly-tailored means.').
2008]
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that the undergraduate admissions policy was not tailored narrowly enough to be a means
of achieving that end.34  In effect the Gratz majority deferred (implicitly) to the
university's decision about the value of a diverse student body, but ultimately found the
method the university adopted to advance that policy wanting.
B. Institutional Autonomy
Proponents of institutional autonomy celebrated Grutter as a victory for the
doctrine 35 and in its aftermath scholars increasingly argued that a wide variety of
organizations-from libraries 3 6  and news organizations 3 7  to churches 3 8  and
corporations 39-were entitled to special deference under the Constitution.
40
Arguments for institutional autonomy rest on a particular theory of
jurisprudence-one that embraces the idea that the legal system should recognize and
respond to categories created outside the law by crafting legal standards that reflect
institutional differences and defer to institutional needs.4 1 It is, as several proponents of
the doctrine have noted, a jurisprudence that breaks radically with the more common
theory that legal principles should be general in application, rather than particularized.
4 2
But those who favor the theory of institutional autonomy note that for all the courts may
declare they favor neutral rules of general application, the reality is different: Some
members of the Supreme Court sometimes have been willing to defer to some judgments
of some decision makers in some institutions.
43
Justice Powell's decision in Bakke was a case in point. He noted that prior
decisions of the Court had carved out a special area of deference that respected the
34. Id. at 275.
35. See e.g. Katyal, supra n. 4, at 558-65.
36. See e.g. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, the
Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC
L. Rev. 799 (2006).
37. See e.g. C. Edwin Barker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause under Existing Law, 35
Hofstra L. Rev. 955 (2007) (arguing that the press should receive special First Amendment rights by virtue of
its institutional status); but see Lillian R. BeVier, The Journalist's Privilege-A Skeptic's View, 32 Ohio N.U.
L. Rev. 467 (2006) (questioning the idea).
38. See e.g. Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts? 22
St. John's J. Leg. Comment. 515 (2007); Andrew Soukup, Reformulating Church Autonomy: How
Employment Division v. Smith Provides a Foundation for Fixing the Neutral Principles Approach, 82 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1679 (2007).
39. See e.g. Michael R. Seibecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach
to the First Amendment, 48 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 613 (2006).
40. See generally Symposium, supra n. 3; but see Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners-
Oh, My! A Cautionary Note about Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L.
Rev. 1635 (2007) (questioning the doctrine).
41. Schauer, supra n. 3, at 84 (making this point specifically with respect to First Amendment doctrine).
42. Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1747, 1758-
60 (2007) (sketching the principle as it has typically been applied to constitutional law by thinkers like Holmes
and Dworkin); see also Horwitz, supra n. 4, at 1504-05 (questioning the idea of neutral principles in higher
education); Soukup, supra n. 38 (questioning the appropriateness of neutral principles in the area of First
Amendment protection of religion).
43. See e.g. Schauer, supra n. 3, at 86-97 (citing the Supreme Court's opinions in Ark. Educ. TV Commn. v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) and Natil. Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) as examples of
an implicit institutional autonomy); see also Horwitz, supra n. 4, at 1516-23 (citing other cases that implicitly
adopted a form of institutional autonomy).
[Vol. 43:725
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educational decisions made by colleges and universities. 44 This deference, derived from
the First Amendment, although frequently denominated Academic Freedom in Court
opinions, extended, Justice Powell averred, to the realm of educational policy decisions
more generally.4 5 That meant the deference went beyond the debates over what to teach
or research that were the usual stuff of academic freedom claims, to include the broader
context in which those decisions were made and disseminated.4 6 In his view, decisions
about who to admit into a university were part of that larger dynamic because of the
impact the student body had on the way classes would engage a variety of issues, and so
they became part of the protected realm of educational policy.
In Bakke, Justice Powell created the doctrine of educational autonomy by bringing
First Amendment principles in contact with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. That connection remained, strengthened by Justice O'Connor's
analysis in Grutter, which emphasized that Justice Powell's theory of deference gave law
schools a way to exempt race-conscious admissions policies from the commands of the
Equal Protection Clause.
4 7
C. K-12 Education
But even though the doctrine of educational autonomy appeared vitalized by
Justice O'Connor's analysis in Grutter, issues of its scope remained. In Bakke, Justice
Powell intimated that arguments for a diverse student body were strongest at the
undergraduate level,4 8 where the benefits of the "'robust exchange of ideas ' ' '49 that
diversity was intended to assist were most pronounced. It was only because the Court
had previously determined that diversity contributed to graduate education in law, 50 that
he was willing to extend that principle to the graduate education of future physicians as
well.51  Justice O'Connor's opinion, with its emphasis on the benefits to the legal
profession and the nation derived from the law school's admissions policies, shifted that
focus to graduate, specifically professional, education.
52
Her emphasis raised the question of whether the doctrine of educational autonomy
should be extended to elementary and secondary schools, either as a general matter or
with respect to school choice and desegregation plans. Some commentators who favored
the doctrine suggested that it was best limited to colleges and universities. 5 3 But others
44. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589; Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234 (Frankfurter, J.
concurring)).
45. Id. at 313-14; see also Katyal, supra n. 4, at 558-60 (the same); R. George Wright, The Emergence of
First Amendment Academic Freedom, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 753, 805 (2002) (noting this shift); but see Caplan, supra
n. 4 (questioning the analysis that supports this extension); Hiers, supra n. 4 (the same).
46. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
47. 539 U.S. at 329-30; but see Balkin, supra n. 23, at 1724-25 (arguing that this analysis amounted to a
rejection of the theory of strict scrutiny).
48. 438 U.S. at 313-14.
49. Id. at 313 (quoting petitioner's brief).
50. Id. at 314 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
51. Id.
52. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332-33.
53. Horwitz, supra n. 4, at 1538 (tying educational autonomy to the academic freedom rights of faculty
members); Katyal, supra n. 4, at 562-63 (emphasizing the relationship between autonomy and academic
freedom, which he characterized as a special privilege of higher education).
20081
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argued the principle had a place in elementary and secondary education, 54 demonstrating
that case law already recognized some degree of deference with respect to the area of
school desegregation plans.55  And after Grutter the lower courts seemed willing to
apply the principle of deference, whether they called it that or not, to a variety of
decisions made in the K-12 setting, from decisions that upheld race-conscious student
assignment plans56 to cases restricting teacher's speech.5 7
III. INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AT THE ROBERTS COURT, OCTOBER 2006 TERM
Two decisions from the October 2006 Term of the Roberts Court explored those
issues. In Parents Involved v. Seattle School District58 the Court considered the doctrine
of educational autonomy in the context of ruling on the constitutionality of two voluntary
school integration plans. And the Court considered whether it was proper to defer to
school administrators in the context of a student's First Amendment claim in Morse v.
Frederick.5 9
A. Parents Involved: Educational Autonomy and the Equal Protection Clause
The Court's decision in Parents Involved, a consolidated opinion involving
challenges to two voluntary desegregation plans (one for Seattle, Washington, 60 the
other for Louisville, Kentucky 61), is striking for several reasons: At the time the case was
argued, the decision in Grutter, which reaffirmed the Court's commitment to the idea
that a diverse student body was "a compelling interest" 62 and an important way to foster
citizenship, 63 was less than five years old. Scholars had demonstrated that a persuasive
case could be made that the federal courts had consistently deferred to the judgment of
54. Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1691 (2004); see also Paul Horwitz, Prawfsblog, Public Schools as First Amendment Institutions?
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2007/03/public_schools_.html (March 21, 2007) (blog posting
arising from the oral argument in Morse v. Frederick, considering whether the doctrine of educational
autonomy should include deference to various First Amendment decisions at the K-I 2 level).
55. See e.g. Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 1162, 1173-84 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc);
McFarland v. Jefferson Co. Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 851-52 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff'd without opinion,
416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Parker, supra n. 54.
56. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1173-84; McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 560-72.
57. See e.g. Mayers v. Monroe Co., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007) (particular circumstances of K-12
education means court should defer to school administration's judgment about the appropriateness of a
teacher's classroom comments); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Bundling and
§1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 561, 582-86 (2008) (noting Mayers and arguing
that Garcetti opens the door to that sort of analysis, particularly by inviting courts to distinguish higher
education faculty from elementary and secondary school teachers); but see Horwitz, supra n. 4, at 1499
(arguing that the language in Garcetti made it clear that the Court intended to carve out an exception for
teacher speech); Horwitz, supra n. 54 (expressing reservations about the idea that educational deference should
apply in a student speech case).
58. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
59. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
60. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d 1162.
61. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d 834.
62. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
63. Id. at 331 (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)).
[Vol. 43:725
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local school boards in implementing voluntary and court ordered desegregation plans.64
The voluntary admission programs adopted in the two school districts seemed tailored
and flexible enough to avoid Bakke's rejection of quotas, since race was not the sole, or
even the first, criterion either district used to make assignments in the few 65 cases where
a student could not be matched to a school of his or her choice. 66 And finally, the lower
courts in each case emphasized that the plans represented the best judgment of the
elected officials charged with determining educational policy;67 as the trial court noted in
McFarland v. Jefferson County School Board, "[t]he historical importance of the
deference accorded to local school boards goes to the very heart of our democratic form
of government." 6 8 The court added that this deference was "conceptually different-
though perhaps more accepted-than the deference discussed in Grutter and Bakke." 6 9
Yet in Parents Involved a majority of the Court held that both plans violated the
Equal Protection Clause. And in reaching that result, the Court seemed to dismiss the
doctrine of educational autonomy. Writing the opinion of the Court, the Chief Justice
gave no weight to the fact that the school boards that adopted the policies at issue in the
cases before it were elected. 70  He rejected the school boards' argument that they
believed that integrated education was in the best interests of all students and the larger
community that they served. 7 1 And he refused to credit the school boards' claims that
they had concluded that assignment plans that combined elements of choice with other
factors that included, but was not limited to, race was the best way to achieve that goal. 7 2
64. Parker, supra n. 54.
65. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760 (noting the minimal effect of the various plans on student choice in
either district); id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("in the case before us it is noteworthy that the number of
students whose assignment depends on express racial classifications is limited."). For estimates of how often
the tie-breaker criteria (which included a race-based component) had to be used, see Parents Involved, 426 F.3d
at 1170 (in 2001-2002, seven out of ten high school districts in Seattle did not need to make enrollment
decisions using the tie-breaker plan at issue in the case; in 2000-2001 roughly 300 of Seattle's 3000 incoming
high school students were assigned using the tie-breaker plan); McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (transfer
and open enrollment applications, the types of applications covered by the plan, amounted to about 7.6% in the
preceding two years, but the number is actually probably less than 5%, since many students apply for a transfer
and open enrollment at the same time).
66. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1184-87 (distinguishing the choice mechanisms employed in Seattle from
the race-based quotas condemned in Bakke and Gratz); McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 841-48, 856-62 (setting
out the criteria for making assignments in Louisville and distinguishing them from the methods that were
rejected in Gratz and Bakke).
67. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1173-84 (noting that Grutter involved educational deference and
exploring the reasons for deference in this case); McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 850-52, 854 (explicitly
recognizing the democratically elected school board was entitled to some deference with regard to how it chose
to organize the Louisville school system and concluding its aims are "important and valid").
68. 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 850 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
69. Id.
70. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2766 (rejecting the argument that there is some reason to defer to the
judgment of the local school districts).
71. Id. at 2756 ("The districts offer no evidence that the level of racial diversity necessary to achieve the
asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the respective school
districts-or rather the white/nonwhite or black/'other' balance of the districts, since that is the only diversity
addressed by the plans.").
72. Id. at 2753 ("In the present cases, by contrast [to Grutter], race is not considered as part of a broader
effort to achieve 'exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints,' ... race, for some
students, is determinative standing alone.").
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 731 2007-2008
TULSA LAW REVIEW
Instead, the Chief Justice employed a strict scrutiny analysis 73 that equated using race as
a factor to achieve integration with the use of race as a factor to achieve segregation
74
and rejected the plans as insufficiently tailored to survive that scrutiny.
A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, 75 read in conjunction with the
dissents, 76 left open the possibility that some school board plans that took race into
account might garner a majority of the Court. 7 7 But while that kept alive the possibility
that some race-conscious acts might survive a future constitutional challenge, the rout of
educational autonomy in Parents Involved seemed complete. Justice Breyer, joined by
three other justices, 78 relied on the doctrine in his dissent, arguing that the case law
established that some degree of deference was appropriate in cases involving educational
decisions made by elected officials.79 But that argument was sharply condemned in the
opinion of the Court8° and in a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. 8 1 Explicitly
rejecting the idea that educational autonomy trumped an Equal Protection claim, the
Chief Justice asserted that "[s]uch deference 'is fundamentally at odds with our equal
protection jurisprudence. We put the burden on state actors to demonstrate that their
race-based policies are justified.'
8 2
Justice Thomas agreed, noting caustically that the idea of giving a democratically
elected government the autonomy to determine the extent of a constitutional right was
precisely the approach adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson and discredited by Brown v. Board
of Education.83  Justice Thomas conceded that the Court had "deferred to state
authorities only once, in Grutter.' 84 But he added that that deference was "prompted by
factors uniquely relevant to higher education, ' 85 factors such as selected, and selective,
admission and the importance of the free exchange of thought.86 Because he concluded
that those factors had no relevance to the type of learning that went on in elementary and
secondary education,87 he refused to extend the principles of Grutter to the facts before
the Court.
73. Id. at 2764; see also id. at 2770-71 (Thomas, J., concurring).
74. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767-68; see also id. at 2786 (Thomas, J., concurring); but see id at
2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning the use of strict scrutiny when applied to race-conscious attempts to
achieve integration); id. at 2816-17 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (making a similar
point).
75. Id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
76. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2800 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter &
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (criticizing the majority
opinion for taking "an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor" in school assignment
decisions).
78. Id. at 2800 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2824.
80. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2766 (quoting W. Va. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("The
Fourteenth Amendment ... protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of
Education not excepted.")).
81. Id. at 2778 (Thomas, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 2766 (majority).
83. Id. at 2783 (Thomas, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 2778.
85. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2778.
86. Id. at 2781 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 2781-82.
[Vol. 43:725
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B. "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS: " Educational Autonomy and Student Speech
In Morse v. Frederick8 the Court considered whether deference to an educational
institution extended into First Amendment law. A majority of the Court held that
Frederick, a high school senior who displayed a sign reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" at
a school event, was not protected by the First Amendment.
Once again, the opinion of the Court89 was written by the Chief Justice. His
opinion modified the famous formulation of Tinker v. Des Moines School District-
"students ... [do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate"9 0 -declaring that the case law after Tinker established that high
school students lost most First Amendment rights while in school.9 1 He added that it
was reasonable to conclude that Frederick's banner advocated drug use, and in light of
the well-established interest in protecting youth from illegal drugs, it was reasonable to
discipline Frederick for displaying the banner.
92
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that that ruling was "deaf to the constitutional
imperative to permit unfettered debate, even among high-school students," 93
complaining that to the extent it rationalized its outcome on the grounds that it was
legitimate to silence any discussion of drugs the Court allowed viewpoint discrimination,
in violation of settled law. 94 Justice Stevens also criticized the Chief Justice's opinion
for a fundamental ambiguity, noting that at times it seemed to defer to the judgment of
the high school principal about the content of, and threat posed by, Frederick's banner,
9 5
while at other times it asserted that the Court had an obligation to independently
determine the banner's meaning.
96
Justice Stevens did not imagine that ambivalence. The Chief Justice conceded that
the case law, which sometimes appeared to endorse educational autonomy, suggesting
that school administrators had "the authority to determine 'what manner of speech in the
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate' 97 and at other times denied such
deference was appropriate, 98 was ambiguous. But because he found that precedent
clearly "demonstrates that 'the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,' 99 the Chief Justice
chose not to resolve the tension between the cases that deferred to the institutional
judgment of school administrators and those that refused to do so.l°°
The two concurring opinions reflected that unresolved tension: In an opinion
88. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
89. Id. at 2622.
90. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
91. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2649 (Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2650.
95. Id. at 2647.
96. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2647 (Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2626 (majority) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
98. Id. (asserting that Fraser was ambiguous on this point).
99. Id. (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682).
100. Id. ("We need not resolve this debate to decide this case.").
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 733 2007-2008
TULSA LAW REVIEW
joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito concurred with the outcome of the case on the
grounds that high school administrators had a particular duty to protect students
entrusted to their care from harm. 10 1 Given the threat posed by drug use, he held that
suppression of Frederick's banner was permissible.' 0 2 But Justice Alito declared in no
uncertain terms that no notion of deference could allow a school administration to decide
to restrict or sanction student speech on political or social topics.
10 3
Surprisingly given his categorical rejection of the doctrine in Parents Involved,
104
Justice Thomas took the opposite tack. He strongly endorsed the idea of educational
autonomy as a limit on student speech in his concurring opinion. 105  He argued that
Tinker should be overruled, 106 since it misstated the law and ignored the fact that
historically public school students had no First Amendment rights. 10 7 He added that
before Tinker "the judiciary was reluctant to interfere with the routine business of school
administration, allowing schools and teachers to set and enforce rules and to maintain
order." 108 Sounding much like Justice Powell in his defense of educational autonomy,
Justice Thomas quoted a late nineteenth-century case:
To accomplish th[e] desirable ends [of teaching self-restraint, obedience, and other civic
virtues], the master of a school is necessarily invested with much discretionary power ....
He must govern these pupils, quicken the slothful, spur the indolent, restrain the
impetuous, and control the stubborn. He must make rules, give commands, and punish
disobedience. What rules, what commands, and what punishment shall be imposed, are
necessarily largely within the discretion of the master, where none are defined by the
school board. 
109
Interestingly, Justice Thomas' strong argument for deference points to a problem
with applying the doctrine to the facts of Morse. As he notes, in the context of
elementary and secondary schools, the doctrine of educational autonomy rests on the
idea that local, elected school officials, administrators, and teachers should be deferred to
when they make judgments about what is best for their school.1 10
But that is not what happened here.111 Principal Morse did not punish Frederick
for unfurling his "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner because it violated a policy that the
101. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito & Kennedy, JJ., concurring).
102. Id.
103. Id. ("[A]ny argument for altering the usual free speech rules in the public schools cannot rest on a
theory of delegation [to school administrators] ...."). In this, Justice Alito's concurring opinion comes close
to the sentiment expressed in Tinker. See 393 U.S. at 511 ("[S]tate-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.").
104. Suprann. 83-87.
105. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2630 (Thomas, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 2636.
107. Id. at 2630-31.
108. Id. at 2632 (citing Sheehan v. Sturges, 2 A. 841, 842 (Conn. 1885)).
109. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Patterson v. Nutter, 7 A. 273, 274 (Me. 1886) (brackets in
original)).
110. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2633 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The doctrine of in loco parentis limited the ability
of schools to set rules and control their classrooms in almost no way."); see also id. at 2635 ("If parents do not
like the rules imposed by these schools, they can seek redress in school boards or legislatures; they can send
their children to private schools or home school them; or they can simply move. Whatever rules apply to
student speech in public schools, those rules can be challenged by parents in the political process.").
111. But see id. at 2624-25 (majority) (making this claim).
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Juneau School Board adopted after considering the educational needs of the students in
their schools or the values of their community. 112 Instead, the anti-drug policy was
adopted in response to a federal mandate, specifically the provisions of the Safe and
Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994, which required all school districts that
accepted federal money certify that they had strong anti-drug policies. 1 13 That mandate
may have reflected the considered opinion of the members of Congress and the
President, it may be a good indication of the national consensus about drug use, but it
undermined, rather than strengthened the ability of local school boards "to determine
'what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate.',114
IV. INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AFTER PARENTS INVOLVED AND MORSE
There are many reasons to criticize the outcomes and the opinions in Morse and
Parents Involved and many commentators did so. 115 Perhaps most problematically, the
Court seemed intent to turn settled law on its head: Declaring the First Amendment
protections for K-12 students must be the exception, not the rule, in Morse1 16 and
explaining, in Parents Involved, that the need for diversity in a graduate program does
not extend to the different circumstances of elementary or secondary education.
117
Considered as applications of the doctrine of educational autonomy, the two cases
tell a confused and complicated story. Initially, they seem to represent an outright
rejection of the doctrine: In the various opinions that made up the two cases every
member of the Court except Justice Breyer 118 rejected the doctrine once. 119 But the
112. Indeed, as the dissent noted, the policy appeared to be at odds with local mores. Id. at 2650 n. 8
(Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2628 (majority) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6) (Supp. 2000)).
114. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
115. See e.g. Lyle Denniston, SCOTUSblog, Commentary: Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate, http://
www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/commentary-beyond-the-schoolhouse-gate/#more-5645 (June 25,
2007) (criticizing Morse for failing to follow Tinker); Pamela S. Karlan, ACSBIog, Law, or Politics, on the
Roberts Court? http://www.acsblog.org/guest-bloggers-guest-blogger-law-or-politics-on-the-roberts-court.html
(July 1, 2007) (discussing Parents Involved and arguing that it "illustrates why the entire enterprise of strict
judicial scrutiny for racial classifications has turned out badly"); Dahlia Lithwick, Slate, A Supreme Court
Conversation, http://www.slate.com/id/2168856/entry/2169029 (June 25, 2007) (discussing Morse and arguing
it was inconsistent with the Court's decision in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, decided the same day); Eugene
Volokh, What Did Morse v. Frederick Do to the Free Speech Rights of Students Enrolled in K-12 Schools?
http://volokh.com/posts/l182830987.shtml (June 26, 2007) (questioning the underlying logic of the Court's
holding on a variety of grounds).
116. Compare Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629 (using language from Tinker to emphasize the constitutional limits
imposed by the "special characteristics of the school environment") with Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 ("students ...
[do not] shed their constitutional rights," even in the special environment of a school).
117. Compare Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2754 ("In upholding the admissions plan in Grutter, though,
this Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher education, noting that in light of 'the
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a
special niche in our constitutional tradition.") with Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94 ("In McLarin v. Oklahoma State
Regents ... the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other
students, again resorted to intangible considerations: '... . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and
exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.' Such considerations apply with
added force to children in grade and high schools.").
118. Justice Breyer relied on the theory of educational autonomy in his dissent in Parents Involved, 127 S.
Ct. at 2811-12 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting), and did not reach the issue in his
concurring opinion in Morse, because he would have found for the school administration on grounds of
qualified immunity. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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opposite is also true. Across the two cases everyone but Justice Alito120 endorsed the
doctrine once. 121
A close reading of the opinions of the Court explains that anomaly, but adds
another layer of confusion. With respect to Morse the rule is clear. Notwithstanding
Justice Thomas' strong support for the doctrine, and the Chief Justice's more lukewarm
endorsement of the principle, a majority of the Court rejected the argument that courts
should routinely defer to the judgment of school administrators in student speech cases.
Justice Stevens explicitly rejected the doctrine in his dissent, which was joined by
Justices Souter and Ginsburg. 12 2  At the same time, Justice Alito, joined by Justice
Kennedy in a concurring opinion, refused to apply the doctrine because it would have
allowed school administrators to silence student speech on political or social issues.
123
While they disagreed about where to draw the line in that particular case, the five
Justices clearly refused to apply the doctrine to student speech cases precisely because to
do so "strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment."
' 124
The picture is murkier in Parents Involved. The four dissenting justices
unequivocally embraced the idea that educational autonomy required deference to school
boards on the issue of student assignment. 125 Four of the justices who signed the Chief
Justice's opinion for the Court unequivocally did not. 126 But Justice Kennedy did not
join that part of the plurality opinion. Instead he agreed with the dissenters that there
was a "compelling interest . . . in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school
district, in its discretion and expertise [might] chose to pursue."' 127  But while he
accepted the principle of educational autonomy, Justice Kennedy did not vote to uphold
the plans before the Court, because he found that they were not tailored enough to
achieve their goals. 128 Specifically, he objected to the fact that while both school boards
rationalized their plans in terms of diversity, both emphasized race. 129
119. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito & Kennedy, JJ., concurring); id. at 2647 (Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg,
JJ., dissenting); Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2766 (Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined Roberts on this point);
id. at 2778 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120. Alito signed on to the Chief Justice's opinion rejecting the doctrine in Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at
2766, and rejected the doctrine in his concurring opinion in Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636-38 (Alito & Kennedy,
JJ., concurring).
121. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626; id. at 2630 (Thomas, J., concurring); Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2824
(Breyer, Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
122. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2647-48 (Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) ("The beliefs of third
parties, reasonable or otherwise, have never dictated which messages amount to proscribable advocacy.
Indeed, it would be a strange constitutional doctrine that would allow the prohibition of only the narrowest
category of speech advocating unlawful conduct ... yet would permit a listener's perceptions to determine
which speech deserved protection.").
123. Id. at 2637 (Alito & Kennedy, JJ., concurring) ("The 'educational mission' argument would give public
school authorities a license to suppress speech on political and social issues based on the viewpoint expressed.
The argument, therefore, strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment.").
124. Id. (Alito & Kennedy, JJ., concurring); id. at 2645 (Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (the
same).
125. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2824 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2766 (Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined Roberts on this point) (majority); see also id. at 2778
(Thomas, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
128. Id at 2790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
129. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2790. Justice Kennedy suggests that he would have accepted the plans'
emphasis on race if the school boards had indicated that their interest was in ending racial isolation, and that he
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While that explains the first anomaly, it suggests another: The justices who
rejected the application of the doctrine in Parents Involved supported their analysis by
asserting that educational autonomy undermined the Court's commitment to subject
race-conscious distinctions to strict scrutiny. 130 And of course the principle that the
Equal Protection Clause requires strict scrutiny in such cases is well established. 13 1 But
the presumption against constitutionality upon which strict scrutiny depends is not
limited to race-based violations of the Equal Protection Clause; the Court has long held
that any law that infringes on the protections of the First Amendment must be subject to
heightened scrutiny. 132 It is, therefore, unclear why any justice who rejected educational
autonomy because it diminished the protections guaranteed by the First Amendment
would not make a similar argument when faced with the claim that educational
autonomy permitted diminution of the protections guaranteed by the Equal Protection
Clause, or vice versa.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Parents Involved suggests the answer,
reformulating the principle of educational autonomy in the process. He argued that the
Equal Protection Clause did not simply prohibit discrimination based on race, but also
imposed an affirmative duty to assure equal opportunity by avoiding racial isolation.
133
And he asserted that a school board that created a properly tailored, race-conscious
school admission plan in order to achieve that second obligation would not run afoul of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 134 While he did not make the point explicitly, that suggests
a plausible way to explain why educational autonomy was rejected in Morse and
accepted (in the abstract) in Parents Involved. In the former case, recognizing
educational autonomy would have made the school administration the sole judge of a
First Amendment claim against it. The majority of the Court refused to defer in that
situation. In the latter, where the school board was not acting as judge of a constitutional
claim made against it, but instead was trying to balance competing constitutional claims,
the majority was willing to defer subject only to the requirement that their resolution of
the problem otherwise met the requirements of the Constitution.
would have accepted a rationale framed in terms of increasing diversity if the plans had taken more factors into
account.
A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its
discretion and expertise, may chose to pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling
interest to achieve a diverse student population. Race may be one component of that diversity, but
other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered.
Id. at 2797. This suggests his sticking point was that he could not accept plans justified in terms of diversity
that looked only to race.
130. Id. at 2766 (majority); Id. at 2783 (Thomas, J., concurring).
131. Chemerinsky, supra n. 23; but see Balkin, supra n. 23 (arguing that the Court had retreated from strict
scrutiny).
132. U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938) (distinguishing the heightened scrutiny
applied to laws that set limits on the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights and in the Fourteenth Amendment
from the more limited scrutiny employed in reviewing legislation that regulates economic interests); see also
Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (noting that the protections of the First Amendment are
incorporated into the Fourteenth because they are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
133. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
134. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Parents Involved v. Seattle School District and Morse v. Frederick offer a glimpse
at the Roberts Court's understanding of the doctrine of educational autonomy. A
majority of the Court (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg) held
that the principle of educational autonomy articulated in Grutter would extend to some
elementary and secondary school districts that crafted race conscious school assignment
plans. A slightly different majority (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Alito) believes that the doctrine cannot protect elementary and secondary school
administrators who seek to discipline students for speech on matters of political or social
concern. But more importantly it suggests that the Court is modifying the doctrine, by
limiting it to cases in which a government institution is balancing competing
constitutional claims.
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